Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford 
In-Care-Of
9847A Witter Springs Road
Witter Springs, California-state [95493] 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR LAKE COUNTY

						)
Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford , Dana E.		)
Wofford, Mark-Evan: Bennett		)	Case NO.: INC.			
	Plaintiffs,				)	
						)	Action to Quiet Title	
		vs. 				)	to Private Allodial Property		
						)		
						)			
M & T BANK, National Association and 	)	
LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF			)	The Constitution for the 		
	Defendants				)	united States of		
						)	America,		
						)	Article Three and	
						)	The Northwest Ordinance		
						)	of 1787		
						)	Trial by the Jury Demanded		
____________________________________)
TO ALL PARTIES OF INTEREST:
I, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, rely upon Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519 (1972), pursuant to the limitations imposed upon me as Plaintiff and this Tribunal by the Constitution of the State of California and the Fifth, and Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. We purchased the land and buildings, which are the subject of this lawsuit, from Anthony W. Trevellick, who accepted a down payment and executed an original promissory note and deed of trust, which was executed by the Plaintiffs and Darrel Wofford and Karen Wofford with the original lender. Darrell and Karen Wofford have since privately agreed in principal to disclaim any right, title and interest in the property and are currently in negotiations with the Plaintiffs to dissolve a long standing partnership and partition the remaining interests in said partnership. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC subsequently purchased the note and deed of trust from Anthony W. Trevellick. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC then sold the note and deed of trust to M & T BANK. We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett have authority and unalienable right to demand that the Defendants; 1.) show how and when they came to have a security interest in my private property described in Exhibit A, 2.) show how when and by what means they have filed a claim against the original land grant petitioned for and granted for the said private property described in Exhibit A, 3.) provide evidence that there is valuable consideration for the alleged bank loan, 4.) provide evidence that the Defendant M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION has the right to lend credit and 5.) provide evidence that the right to subrogation exists, and provide evidence that the mortgage debt complies with all requirements of the Federal and State Constitution or; 6.) forever abandon any claim of interest in our property and stop the fraudulent and scandalous action to foreclose on their fraudulent chattel paper, for which no valuable consideration was ever provided in the original mortgage. 

We have named LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF as a Defendant to ensure that said Sheriff refrains from any and all unlawful activities at the direction of M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION that will be inconsistent with our ownership and lawful control of the private property, which is the subject of this action to quiet title. We fully understand that the courts in California routinely allow banks to circumvent California Civil Code Section 2924, requiring any sale of property in foreclosure to be preceded by a court order from a Superior Court judge, and that the Sheriff would be called upon to carry out an unlawful act in violation of our property rights. In furtherance of that goal we have asked the court, as part of the relief sought herein, for an order of cease and desist, commanding the Defendants to cease and desist from any actions to foreclose on the note and deed of trust in light of the lack of the right of subrogation and the failure of consideration, which is discussed below. We are not asking for financial compensation from the LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF in this action to quiet title.

ALL PARTIES PLEASE TAKE NOTICE:
We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett purchased the land and buildings located at 642 Main Street, Lakeport, California from Anthony W. Trevellick, expecting that we would be doing business with Anthony W. Trevellick as the lender and holder of the note, by paying him the monthly payments due on the note. I, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, am one of the people of California for which the California Constitution was created in this court of record, and I Dana E. Wofford am one of the people of California for which the California Constitution was created in this court of record, and I, Mark-Evan: Bennett am one of the people of California for which the California Constitution was created in this court of record, complain of the fraudulent acts and deceptive banking practices of the Defendant, M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION who has purchased a note created and executed by Anthony W. Trevellick. The Defendant, M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION purchased the note from BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, who had previously purchased the note from Anthony W. Trevellick. The note was purchased without any valuable consideration and without the Defendant M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION pledging any pre-existing money or any of their own assets in the transaction and without the Defendant, M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION incurring any financial cost in the transactions associated with the alleged loans of public currency otherwise known as Federal Reserve Notes. It is well understood by bank accountants and CPAs that a promissory note, when deposited, is treated by the banks as the same as the deposit of cash or a paycheck by the customer. In this context the Plaintiff’s are the banks customer. The alleged loan was funded by the creation of a demand deposit account by both BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC and later by M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, which was derived by depositing the promissory note into said demand deposit account and the converting the funds created by that promissory note, WHICH WAS THE BORROWERS MONEY, into a source of funding for the public currency loaned, MAKING THE LOAN TRANSACTION A MUTUAL LOAN BETWEEN THE LENDER AND THE BORROWER. This will be well documented by the use of a CPA or retired bank accountant as a witness, who will describe, in detail, the accounting practices that banks use when they create public currency. Neither BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC nor the Defendant, M & T BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, hereinafter M & T BANK, used or pledged any of their own pre-existing money, pre-existing assets or depositor’s money in the transaction. The Defendant, M & T BANK, has not and will not incur any financial loss or damages by our failure to pay the note. Furthermore, the Defendant, M & T BANK, does not have the right of subrogation as a stranger to the transaction, and as someone who has not paid the entire mortgage debt in full, see 73 AM JUR Second, Section 90.  

California courts are courts of record, pursuant to Article Six of the California Constitution, and it is, therefore, is important to understand the characteristics of a court of record as follows: Please see Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition pages 425 and 426 for further discussion of the court of record as follows; “Courts of record are those whose acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled or recorded for a perpetual memory and testimony and which have the power to fine and imprison for contempt........ A “court of record” is a judicial tribunal having attributes and exercising functions independently of the Magistrate designated generally to hold it, and proceeding according to the course of the common law, its acts and proceedings being enrolled for a perpetual memorial. Jones v. Jones; 188 Mo. App.220 175 S.W. 227, 229; Ex Parte Gladhill, 8 Metc., Mass. 171, per Shaw, C. J. See also Ledwith v Rosalski; 244 N.Y. 406,155 N.E.688, 689.” (emphasis mine). 

JURISDICTION

	Our court of record is convened in this matter pursuant to Article Three of our Constitution for the united States of America, as a Judicial court of Law in our Judicial Branch of government, while in session under the rules of the Common Law as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in Article Two. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 US 540 (1888) for authority that Article Three of the United States Constitution provides for and mandates common law jurisdiction and venue. 

	Our one supreme court, which is now styled as Superior court was created by constitutional convention on the seventeenth day of the ninth month in the year of our Lord one -thousand -seven -hundred and eighty -seven, and is not to be confused with the United States Supreme Court which was created by congress in the year of our Lord one thousand -seven -hundred and eighty -nine as an inferior court to our one supreme court. Any reference back to the original Judiciary Acts of Congress or other historical documents will confirm that this is what was described by the phrase “one supreme court” in Article Three of the original Constitution for the United States of America. 

Under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution for the united States of America, I am entitled to a common law trial by the jury.  On dry land, any action must be adjudicated under common law pursuant to the Seventh Amendment; 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States of America; 226 US 172 (1912). The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also mandates judicial proceedings under the course of the common law; under     Article Two, and places an absolute requirement on the new states upon admission to the union to be admitted into the union on an equal footing with all other states and to agree to the terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The act of Congress admitting California into the union also invoked the equal footing doctrine, which makes California, and their government, a state which is bound by the Northwest Ordinance of     1787. California is on an equal footing with all other states such as Illinois and Indiana, which are formed from the Northwest Territory. Requirements cannot be placed on some states and not others under the equal footing doctrine. Additionally, a court of record is a court which exercises jurisdiction under the course of the common law, please see Blacks Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, pages 425 and 426.

Common law jurisdiction and venue is mandated by California statute.  As a matter of law, the foundation of the jurisdiction of this case, is established by Stats. 1850, ch. 95 which  expressly states:

	"The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or law of the State of California, shall be the rule of decision in all the Courts of this State." 

	  It is settled as a matter of law that when the rules of common law are not repugnant to organic or state law, the court cannot ".....adopt a rule other than that established by the common law."  Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal 255, at 261.

	 Under the ruling in Lux v Haggin, supra...as a prerequisite for the court to apply any rule of decision other than that of the  common law, the court would necessarily be required to establish and prove that the rules of the common law which would ordinarily apply in the instant case are repugnant to the organic or state law. Since repugnant means extremely distasteful or in direct conflict with, if an actual repugnance were in existence it could be clearly shown and established. It should be further noted that because California became one of the several states on an equal footing with all other states as mandated in the Act of Admission of California into the union, which is further echoed by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which mandates that first; all states are admitted to the union on an equal footing with all existing states and second; that as a matter of compact new states, which includes all states under the equal footing doctrine, must guarantee "judicial proceedings in accordance with the course of the common law". Since admission into the union of states was a stated objective of the California Constitution of 1849, the original delegates to the California Constitutional Convention either knew or should have known about the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution for the united States of America, and they either knew or should have known about the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 both of which mandates common law jurisdiction and venue.

Therefore, the act of admission into the union is a compact by the people of California agreeing to common law jurisdiction and venue, establishing through the Act of Admission into the union and the State Constitution, the organic law of California.

	 The California Supreme Court has ruled  that " .....where the code is silent, the common law governs." Estate of Apple, 66 Cal. 432.  

 	We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, the Plaintiff, hereby declare, as a matter of law, that all twenty -nine (29) divisions of the California code are silent. This is an indisputable fact in that the original four divisions of the code were never assigned chapter numbers and were never published as part of the Statutes of California 1871 -2. Additionally, there are no enacting clauses in front of each statute, making them void for failure to declare, from whence they came. Also these Codes were adopted by the legislature en-masse as a series of code sections, which were made a part of a single statute which embraces more than a single subject, meaning that the validity and force and effect of all of the California Codes are called into question.

VENUE

	Lakeport in Lake -county, California republic, under the rules of the Common Law, is the proper venue for this matter to be heard by consent of all parties on the following grounds: 
	The location of the court will be the most convenient forum for all parties, and since any issue in controversy allegedly and originally arose in that same geographic area. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE

First; As  property owners in Lake-county, we, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, recorded the deed, to said property described in Exhibit A in the united States of America venue, We have a common undivided interest in the property. Please see Exhibit A for evidence of the deed recorded in allodial title under the venue of the united States of America It is no longer in the venue of the UNITED STATES. This land is now our private property to which we have allodial title, which means absolute ownership. we own the property in allodium and in “Dominium Directum Et Utile”,  please see Fairfax v. Hunter; 7 Cranch 603, 3 L. Ed. 453. We have complete and absolute dominion in our property; which is the union of the title and the exclusive use of it. We became aware, after careful study and analysis, that the original note and deed of trust that we executed claims a security interest in the subject property based upon the transfer of Federal Reserve notes, which is commercial paper, as described in Clearfield Trust Company v US; 318 US 363; which states; “the United States as a drawee of commercial paper [federal reserve notes] stands in no different light than any other drawee” (bracketed portion ours). 

The Defendant, M & T BANK, has begun to demand payment for flood insurance, which is not called for or required in the original note and deed of trust. The Defendant, M & T BANK, is preparing to foreclose, based upon their attempt to collect the insurance. After reviewing the legal issues surrounding the request for payment of the insurance we discovered that the US Supreme Court has stated that the right of subrogation does not exist for a stranger to the transaction, Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 US 534. We also realized, after careful study and analysis, that the Federal Reserve System never provides anything of substance or intrinsic value when they create the credit, which is only a bookkeeping entry for the loan which is created by completing a ledger entry in the records of the bankers who wrote the original note and deed of trust, Please See Exhibit B. The Defendant, M & T BANK, in this matter will not incur a financial cost or damages by our failure, to pay the alleged balance due on the note in this matter. When the Defendant creates money it does not cost them anything to create said money. 

We base our statement of fact upon pages 9,10, 11, 22, 23, and 24 of the House Banking and Currency Committee Report called “Money Facts” published in 1964, which states on page 23 the following; “The business of banks is to lend money. The profit comes from the difference between the cost of creating money and the price they charge borrowers for that money. Now the cost of creating money is negligible. Congress has delegated the power to create money to the banking system without a charge. The banks do not pay a license fee or a payment charge for their reserves. Thus the raw materials the banks use cost them nothing.”  (Emphasis added). My statement is derived from the technical descriptions of banking practices found in Money Facts, published in 1964 by the house banking committee, which is hereby incorporated by reference in this action to quiet title as Exhibit B. The organic law of this nation requires that “no state shall... make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts”, Constitution for the united states of America, Article One, Section Ten. The current Federal Reserve Banking Scheme is based upon the deliberate and planned raising of interest rates by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in October of 1929, and the subsequent deliberate crash of the stock market in 1929, called black Monday. The Bankers, stockholders in the Federal Reserve Bank, then with their proxies and agents in the government, the criminal element in government, hereinafter CEG, forced the UNITED STATES into a permanent state of declared national emergency on March 9, 1933, in the Emergency Banking Bill, 48 Stat.1, Public Law 89-719; declared by President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent in Several Executive Orders No. 6073, 6102, No. 6101, No. 6260 and was later seconded by Congress on June 5, 1933 with the passage of HJR 192, making all Americans the ‘enemy’ in paragraph 5(b) of the Trading with Enemies Act. Please see Senate Report 93- 549, dated 1973, for confirmation of the above. Said Bankers then placed the UNITED STATES into receivership based upon the Bankruptcy filed by an Act of Congress, HJR 192, dated June 5, 1933. 

The real party in interest for the bankruptcy was never stated, but is clearly the British Royal Family, based upon the Treaty of Peace of 1783, and Jays Treaty 1791. These two documents created a fraudulent reversal of the State of Independence won by a long and bloody battle with the British during the Revolutionary War, by stating that King George is the Prince of the United States of America in the Treaty of Peace of 1783, and the subsequent paying of reparations in Jay’s treaty. Neither treaty appears to have been ratified by Congress and specifically contravened direct orders by Congress to the treaty negotiators, John Jay, John Adams and Benjamin Franklin. As a result, these treaties were not executed under the authority of the body politic and are without force and effect in law. 

Through the above described actions by the bankers and American government officials who committed acts of treason against the American people, the bankers, through their manipulation of Congress and President Roosevelt in 1933, and earlier, in the eighteenth Century, the treaty negotiators, the Bankers obtained control over our currency system, forced us into bankruptcy and created a new government under the bankruptcy, with new emergency powers for the reconstituted government. 

The new currency, after the bankruptcy in 1933, became a debt instrument, which the American people have to pay with no backing by gold and silver, as required under Article One, Section Ten of our Federal Constitution. All bank loans in the continental United States are fraudulent in their very nature because the Federal Reserve Notes they are based on are only based upon book keeping entries by the bankers and represent no value, and no valuable consideration. The original mortgage is therefore chattel paper with no valuable consideration and therefore the whole mortgage contract is based upon fraud and a lack of valuable consideration since Federal Reserve Notes have no intrinsic value whatsoever, and are just bookkeeping entries under the 1933 bankruptcy. If said currency, Federal Reserve Notes, were backed by something of intrinsic value, then the currency could be considered to be valuable consideration, because the currency, could be exchanged for something of recognized value, and the lender of the Federal Reserve Notes, would then be pledging their own assets in the transaction.  We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, the Plaintiffs, are not a surety for this fraudulent national debt. We are not a subject of the British Royal Family, we are not US Citizens under the jurisdiction of Washington, D.C., and we are not co-bankrupt debtors for this fraudulent debt, and we are not part of the fraudulent Federal Reserve Banking Scheme. 

The banks involved in this matter, are committing fraud and fraudulent conversion by attempting to transform the mortgage backed by no valuable consideration, into a security device which can be used to obtain a lien and subsequent ownership of our property, all without lawful money which is mandated by Article One, Section Ten as stated above and without due process of law; a trial by the jury of our peers, as required by the Fifth and Seventh Amendments respectively. 

The Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-interest did not loan anything of substance or intrinsic value, but they loaned their own credit in the transaction. Federal Reserve notes are bank credit and as such are not backed by gold or silver coin as required under Article One, Section ten of the US Constitution. This is an absolute requirement pursuant to the ruling by the US Supreme Court in Woodruff v. Mississippi, see Woodruff v. Mississippi; 162 US 291;16 S. Ct. 820; 40 L. Ed. 973. We quote Woodruff v. Mississippi, supra, as follows; “the power to borrow money, simply, meant the power to borrow whatever was money according to the Constitution of the United States and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, and the power to issue negotiable bonds included the power to make that payable in such money. This the law presumed, and to proceed on an implication to the contrary was to deny the holders of these bonds, subsequent to their purchase, a right arising from the Constitution and laws of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)  Furthermore the common law does not recognize a contract to be valid where there is no valuable consideration, such as this case, where nothing of substance or value was loaned in the transaction. The “money” loaned was bank credit, created by a series of bookkeeping entries created by BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, which was derived from the sale of the promissory note to BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC and subsequently, sale of the note to the Defendant. 

This fraudulent mortgage can, under this fraudulent banking scheme, thus be converted into a fraudulent lien based upon no valuable consideration, obtained by establishing a banking system of bookkeeping entries for commercial federal reserve ‘credit’ with no backing by gold or silver, as required by Article One, Section Ten of our Federal Constitution, or anything of substance or intrinsic value and then placing a fraudulent lien or security device on our land and using this fraudulent devise and claiming to be the holder in due course on the deed to our land. The bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES under HJR 192 removed gold backing from the currency as of June 5, 1933, under said Act of Congress, and set up the fraudulent and pernicious Federal Reserve bankruptcy system. The defendants, as a result, operate under a presumptive claim of ownership, which is ultimately based upon no valuable consideration and upon the Bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES declared by Congress on June 5, 1933, under House Joint Resolution 192, dated June 5, 1933 and the State of Declared National Emergency declared by Congress on March 9, 1933.  

Both of these events forever altered the structure and fabric of American government as it was established by the founding fathers during and after the period of the revolutionary war from 1775 until about 1792 and gave, through sedition, a financial stronghold to the international bankers who hold a stockholders position in the Federal Reserve Bank/System, and who, are belligerent foreign principals in a dramatically altered American Government/ Federal Reserve Banking scheme that is operating without the authority of the American people. 

Full disclosure was never given to the American people of the names of the creditors or the nature of the obligation the American people have been forced to take on under the Federal Reserve Banking Scheme and the bankruptcy of the United States and state governments as accommodation parties. See also Senate report 93-549. Nowhere in the blueprint for the federal and state governments, our American Constitution, is there a provision for foreign or domestic financiers and industrialists to take over the reins of government through a perpetual state of bankruptcy, with no named creditors, no financial reorganization plan and no accountability by elected officials for having paid the Federal Reserve trillions of dollars and billions of dollars worth of gold, for their service of “loaning money into circulation” and thereby bankrupting the federal and state governments. 

Please see Exhibit B, Money Facts, a report by the House Banking Committee, published in 1964, page 9 for a discussion of how banks get money and how their Reserves are created. The British Royal Family appears to be the real party in interest based upon the Treaty of Peace of 1783 and Jays Treaty, which appears to give The British Royal Family a fraudulent dominion over the United States of America, as The ‘Prince of the United States of America’ in the First paragraph of the Treaty of Peace. This was contrary to the explicit instructions given to the Treaty delegation of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay by the Congress of the United States prior to their trip to Paris to negotiate the Treaty.

The above provision of the Treaty of Peace is therefore not a lawful provision. In addition, the original mortgage is void, unenforceable and without force and effect, because of a lack of valuable consideration, and breach of contract. 

Second; The assign, M & T BANK alleged purchased the note and deed of trust for the land and buildings which is the subject of this dispute from the original lender, BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC and attempted to collect payment on the note without the right of subrogation. The assign, M & T BANK, made a demand for payment and then moved for foreclosure on the note even though they do not have the right of subrogation as a party who is not a cosigner to the note and the action by the original lender selling the land and home to a stranger to the transaction is not agreed to by me and is therefore an unlawful act, and a breach of trust, see Aetna L. Ins, Co. v. Middleport, 124 US 534. 

I sent the lender a written request to validate the debt, see Exhibit C. They did not respond to my request.  The lender is currently in default on my request that they provide a validation of the debt and prove that they have the right of subrogation. This failure to answer is an admission of the truth and validity of the contents of the constructive notice under the doctrine of laches, res adjudicata, nil deceit, silence by acquiesence  and tacit procuration.

The Uniform Commercial Code also reflects these principals of common law that once a debtor makes a good faith offer of performance and it is not accepted, the obligation is extinguished, pursuant to UCC 3-603. The defendants cannot produce a verified claim for which relief can be granted. 

They steadfastly refused to respond to our constructive notice, See Exhibit C. 

Third; The mortgage note and deed of trust cannot form the basis of any kind of lien or security against our private allodial property because we are the assignee to the original land patent which was applied for and obtained by our predecessor -in -interest, who filed the original petition for the land patent and received the original land patent, without the defendants in this matter ever having filed a claim against the original land patent. Furthermore, the US Supreme Court has ruled that when land which has been patented by a land owner, or a predecessor -in -interest, the state, or any other entity, person, natural or artificial or party such as a bank or corporation, is barred from making any claim against the land, once a two year window expires for challenging the original land patent or making a claim, such as that of a public trust easement. Adverse claims cannot attach to patented land pursuant to the acts of the Federal Government authorizing said patents.

The private property in question, which is defined in Exhibit A, is also a parcel of land that was once a part of a much larger tract of land patented by our predecessor -in -interest in a land patent procedure. Thus, the issuance of a Federal Land Patent barred any future claims against the land. Please see Summa Corp. v California Ex Rel; 104 US 1751 (1984), which states;  “We hold that California cannot at this late date, assert it’s public trust easement over petitioner’s property, when petitioner’s predecessors -in -interest had their interest confirmed without any mention of such an easement in proceedings taken pursuant to the act of 1851.” Claims by government agencies or states or counties are no different than claims by private corporations and banks, such as the defendants are.  Neither the defendants nor the original mortgage company filed any sort of competing claim in the patent proceeding for this land. Therefore, under the above cited US Supreme Court ruling and many others, neither the defendants nor the original mortgage holder has any legitimate or lawful claim to the land. We, the Plaintiff in this matter, have allodial title, which is the highest title anyone can have on their land. No one has superior title. As the Plaintiff, we, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett seek to quiet title against all claims by defendants to any security interest, lien, right, title or interest, in our property. The Defendants adverse fraudulent claims are without any rights whatsoever, without any foundation in law, and cannot in any way extinguish our lawful common law exclusive claim to our own private allodial property.
 
Fourth; We believe that the organic laws of the united States of America, including all founding documents and charters give us  sovereignty and thereby a right to private citizenship allodial titles to land and access to common law courts, which are derived from the people of the body politic, which created the government and all the rights and freedoms which are associated with the organic laws created by the body politic. I cite the following case below:

 The US Supreme Court has affirmed the notion that each Citizen is sovereign and that state governments are bound by the Federal Constitution; “ From the crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country passed to the people of it, and it was then not an uncommon opinion that the un-appropriated lands, which belonged to that crown, passed not to the people of the colony or states within those limits they were situated, but to the whole people..... ‘We the people of the United States do ordain and establish this constitution.’ Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country; and in the language of sovereignty, establishing a constitution  by which it was their will, that the State governments, should be bound, and to which the State constitutions should be made to conform.

	It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England exist on feudal principals. That system considers the prince as the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject either in a court of justice or elsewhere. 
	
That system contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant, derives all franchises, immunities and privileges; it is easy to perceive, that such a sovereign could not be amenable to a court of justice, or subjected to judicial control and actual constraint.

	The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, and they are sovereigns without subjects...and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow-citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty. 

	From the differences existing between feudal sovereignties and governments founded on compacts, it necessarily follows, that their respective prerogatives must differ.  Sovereignty is the right to govern; the nation or state sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the prince; here it rests with the people; there the sovereign actually administers the government, here never in a single instance; our governors are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same relation to their sovereign, in which the regents of Europe  stand to their sovereign. 

Their princes have personal powers, dignities and preeminence, our rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.”  Chisolm v. Georgia; 2 Dall (U.S.) 419  (1793) (emphasis mine).  

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Quiet Title)
	First. The defendants do not have a security interest in our property because of the lack of the right of subrogation.  They claim that their purchase of the note from the original lender forms the foundation of their authority to take our land by a foreclosure action. There is no right of subrogation for the Defendant, M & T BANK. Additionally, there is no valuable consideration, since only Federal Reserve Notes were received, which are not backed by any hard asset of the bank or anything which has any redemption value. None of the Plaintiffs remember ever signing over a security interest, based upon valuable consideration to the defendants or anyone else. The defendant, M & T BANK, purchased the promissory note from BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, who  purchased the note from the original lender, Anthony W. Trevellick, for an undisclosed amount, even though they were not a cosigner on the original note, meaning they did not have the right of subrogation. As a result of their not having the right of subrogation, the Defendant, M & T BANK, is a stranger to the transaction and has no right, title or interest to our land and buildings ANY FORECLOSURE ACTION BY THEM is unenforceable and void ab intio, from the beginning. The Defendant, M & T BANK, had a duty, as an alleged creditor to prove that they have a right of subrogation if they are a co-signer, and prove that they are a co-signer, if in fact they are, and additionally, prove that they have paid the entire debt in full, prior to taking steps to foreclose on our property, the land and buildings, which is the subject of this civil action. The Defendant, M & T BANK, did not do this, and by their failure to prove that they are a co-signer on the original note and that their failure to prove that they have paid the entire mortgage debt in full, they have failed to perform a duty, which they are required to perform under California law. 

“Subrogation in equity is confined to the relation of principal and surety and guarantors, to cases where a person to protect his own junior lien is compelled to remove one which is superior, and to cases of insurance....Anyone who is under no legal obligation or liability to pay the debt is a stranger, and, if he pays the debt, a mere volunteer.”. (emphasis mine) Aetna Life v. Middleport, 124 US 534, quoting Suppiger v. Garrels, 20 Bradwell App Ill. 625. The defendant, M & T BANK, were clearly never cosigners or sureties in the original Promissory note. The Lake County Sheriff has an auxiliary role to play in this matter, assisting M & T BANK in their unlawful activities.

The Defendants violated our right to due process of law, as guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution by presenting themselves as a party who has a right to enforce the original contract, although they clearly are not now, nor have they ever been a co-signer to the original note. Because they have no right of subrogation, they have no right to enforce the note, and thereby no right to foreclose or to claim any right, title or interest in the property. We have a right to expect that anyone who is attempting to foreclose on the property has the right to do so as someone who has standing. The Defendant clearly has never had standing to foreclose, based upon the above case law and facts. Please note that the Defendant, M & T BANK, has never claimed that they have the right of subrogation. They have never brought forward evidence that refutes, rebuts, challenges or denies our statement of fact that the Defendant, M & T BANK, does not have the right of subrogation and is not a co-signer. California Courts are bound by the US Constitution and laws passed in pursuance thereof. This requirement is found in the California Constitution of 1849 under Article Seven, Section Twelve, which states, in relevant part: 

“Sec. 12. The Senators and Representatives to the Congress of the United
    State, elected by the Legislature and People of California, as herein
  directed, shall be furnished with certified copies of this Constitution,
    when ratified, which they shall lay before the Congress of the United
 States, requesting, in the name of the People of California, the admission
            of the State of California into the American Union.”

As a result it was clearly the intention of the delegates to the constitutional convention held in 1849 in California to become one of the several states of the Union of states known as the united States of America and to be bound by the decisions of the US Supreme Court. 
 
When there is fraud involved, then any action that flows from that fraud is null and void and without force or effect in law, Ex Dolo Malo Non Oritur Actio,  out of fraud no action arises. Additionally, If this is true the Defendants are liable for fraud, fraudulent conversion and attempted theft of private land. This claim of ownership of our buildings and land without a judicial trial by the jury, and without due process of law, access to an appeals process, a final judgment by a court, represents a taking of property without due process of the law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to our Federal constitution and similar provisions in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 

	The Fifth Amendment to our Federal Constitution of 1787, The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Article Two and similar provisions of the California Constitution, guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, The Plaintiffs, do not recall ever having been given a summons or subpoena or other lawful notice requiring our presence in court in a Quiet Title Action. We do not recall ever having been to court over this matter in a Quiet Title Action pursuant to California law. We do not recall a trial by the jury, final judgment, access to the appeals process or having seen a court order regarding a determination of Title in an action to Quiet Title. The Seventh Amendment to our federal constitution and Article Two of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 guarantees common law. The defendants actions are not the result of a common law ruling and due process in a court of law, “The 7th Amendment to the Constitution preserves the right of trial by jury in suits at common law involving more than $20, and provides that no fact tried by a jury, shall be reviewed otherwise than according to the rules of the common law.”, see 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States of America; 226 US 172. The defendants have failed to prove or show a court order authorizing private property to be liened, levied or seized based upon a determination of title in an Action to Quiet Title as required under the rules of the common law, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Defendants are attempting to use the organs and institutions of government to obtain title to the property and hold a foreclosure sale without due process of law, and without a trial by the jury under the rules of the common law. The common law right of due process is found in the Fifth, Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to our federal constitution. Please see California Civil Code Section 2924, which requires the creditor to foreclose and hold a sale of the property only after there is a judgment in a court of law.  The actions taken by the defendants, attempt to deprive us of our liberty and property without due process of law. Article Three of the original constitution for the united States of America calls for either law or equity courts, depending on the circumstances, see Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, (1888) "And as the guaranty of a trial by jury, in the third article, implied a trial in that mode, and according to the settled rules of common law”. Actions by them to claim to have a security interest in our private land and buildings and personal property and claim authority to hold a foreclosure sale is an action beyond the scope of their authority. This is described by the United States Supreme Court as tyranny in; United States v. Lee; 106 US 196, 1S. Ct. 240 (1882) where the United States claimed ownership of property via a tax sale some years earlier, the court stated as follows:

	“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power of our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives...... Shall it be said ... that the courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his liberty by force, his estate seized and converted to the use of the government without any lawful authority, without any process of law, and without any compensation, because the president has ordered it and his officers are in possession? If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal rights.” In the above-cited case the government can be considered as similar and applying in like manner as the defendants in the above captioned case. If government agencies cannot take private property without due process of law, how can a bank or mortgage company do so? 

	The Supreme Court also reaffirmed the right to enjoy private property and not be deprived of it without due process of law in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.; 405 US 538 (1972);

	“Such difficulties indicate that the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a “personal” right whether the “property” in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal 
right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been recognized. J. Locke Of Civil Government 82- 85(1924); J. Adams A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in  F. Coker Democracy, Liberty and Property 121-132 (1942); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 138-140.”  

The taking of private property without due process is clearly a violation of civil liberties as well as personal rights. One of the settled principles of our Constitution is that these Amendments are to protect only against invasion of civil liberties by the government whose conduct they alone limit. Burdeau v. McDowell ; 256 US 465, 41 S. Ct. 574, 65 L Ed. 104813 ALR 1159 (1921); Weeks v. United States; 232 US 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, (1914);Hall v. United States; 41, F 2d 54(9th Cir. 1930); Brown v. United States; 12 F 2d. 926 (9th Cir. 1926). Therefore the organs of government cannot be used to participate and assist in the unlawful plunder of our private allodial property.  

Second. In the United States of America, after of the Revolutionary War of 1775, feudal titles came to an end and were replaced by allodial titles. This structural change in the nature of titles, which came with self government, is aptly described by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Wallace v Harmstad 44 Pa. 492; 1863 (1863) which states the following; 

“I see no way of solving this question except by determining whether our Pennsylvania titles are allodial or feudal. It seems strange that so fundamental a question as this should be in doubt at this day.....

“He defines a feud as a tract of land held by a voluntary and gratuitous donation, on   condition of fidelity and certain services, and allodial lands as those whereof the owner had   the dominium directum et verum the complete and absolute property, free from all services  from any particular lord...........  

“... the Revolution would have operated very inefficiently towards complete emancipation 
if the feudal relation had been suffered to remain. It was therefore necessary to extinguish all foreign interest in the soil, as well as foreign jurisdiction in the manner of government. 
“we are then to regard the Revolution and these Acts of the Assembly  as emancipating every acre of the soil (of Pennsylvania) from the grand characteristic of the feudal system.” 

From this and our understanding of the Equal Footing Doctrine, as described earlier from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, we conclude that titles in all of the several states of the united States of America are purely allodial. Our allodial title means that we are not vassals, serfs or indentured servants. The defendant, M & T BANK, does not have a lawful claim to our buildings and land. The defendant, M & T BANK, does not have a higher title than we do, or any right, title or interest in our property except perhaps by fraud which is void ab initio, since fraud vitiates everything.   

	Third. Patented Land cannot be collaterally attacked. The private property in question, which is defined in Exhibit A, is also a parcel of land that was once a part of a much larger tract of land patented by our predecessor -in -interest in a land patent procedure. Please see Summa Corp. v California Ex Rel; Supra (1984), which states;  “We hold that California cannot at this late date, assert it’s public trust easement over petitioner’s property, when petitioner’s predecessors -in -interest had their interest confirmed without any mention of such an easement in proceedings taken pursuant to the act of 1851.” Claims by government agencies are no different than claims by private corporations and banks, such as the defendants are.  Neither the defendants nor the original mortgage holder filed any sort of competing claim, or any other sort of claim in the patent proceeding for this land. See also Gibson v. Chouteau; 13 Wall 92; 20 L. Ed. 534, which states “In an action of ejectment in state courts, when the question presented is whether the plaintiff or the defendant has the superior legal title from the United States, the Patent must prevail.” See also Field v. Seabury; 19 How 323; 15 L. Ed. 650; “A court of law in a state where strict common law prevail will not look behind or beyond the grant, to the rights upon which it is founded, nor examine the progressive stages of the title antecendent to the grant.” Ross v.Doe; ex dem. Barland 1 Pet 655; 7 L. Ed 302. “ A patent for lands is conclusive in an action at law as to the legal title, and cannot be collaterally impeached unless absolutely void on its face, or issued without authority.” St Louis Smelting and Refining Co. v. Kemp; 104 US 636; 26 L. Ed 875. “Only one having a prior right can attack a patent collaterally.” Doolan v. Carr; 125 US 618; 8 S. Ct. 1228. “A patent is the highest evidence of title and is conclusive against the government and all claiming under junior patents and titles.” United States v. Maxwell Land Grant Co.; 121 US 325; 7 S. Ct. 1015. Stone v. US; 2 Wall 525; 17 L. Ed 765.

Therefore, pursuant to these US Supreme Court rulings neither the defendants nor the original mortgage holder have any claim to or right, title or interest in our private land and home. We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, the Plaintiffs in this matter have allodial title, which is the highest title anyone can have on their land. No one has superior title. As the Plaintiffs, we, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, seek to quiet title against all claims by the defendants to any security interest, lien, right, title or interest, or power to take control of our property. The Defendant, M & T BANK’s adverse fraudulent claims is without any rights whatsoever, without any foundation in law, and cannot in any way extinguish our lawful common law exclusive claim to our own private allodial real property. We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, the Plaintiffs in this matter, seek to quiet title as of the date of the constructive notice mailed to the Defendant.

	Fourth. The Defendants Have no Right of Subrogation as a Stranger to the Transaction, a mere volunteer and as a Party who has not Tendered the Full Amount of the Mortgage Debt. The right of Subrogation does not exist for the Defendants or their assigns, agents, or principals. The assignment of the note and deed of trust for our property is unlawful since the assignee was a stranger to the transaction and has not provided evidence that they paid off the entire mortgage in full. M & T BANK has failed to provide any evidence in this matter of payment of the entire Mortgage debt in full, therefore under the doctrine of latches, the presumption that the Defendant, M & T BANK, did not pay the entire mortgage debt in full is unrebutted and is therefore a fact undisputed and agreed to by the Defendants, see, 73 Am Jur Second, Section 90 which states that a right of subrogation does not exist for a mere volunteer, or some one who has not paid the entire mortgage debt in full. Please review the following for affirmation that the right of subrogation does not exist for the Defendant in this matter; Henningsen  v. United States Fidelity & G. Co.; 208 US 404; 52 L. Ed 547, 28 S. Ct. 389; Prairie State National Bank v. United States; 164 US 227; 41 L. Ed. 412; 17 S. Ct. 142; Aetna L. Ins. Co. v.  Middleport; 124 US 534; 31 L. Ed. 537; 8 S. Ct. 625; McBride v. McBride; 148 Or 478 36 P 2d 175.

 AS A RESULT, THE DEFENDANT, M & T BANK, HAS NO RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION TO QUIET TITLE, AS ONE WHO DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF SUBROGATION OF THE ORIGINAL NOTE THAT THEY ALLEGEDLY PURCHASED AND THAT WAS ALLEGEDLY ASSIGNED TO THEM. THEY HAVE NO STANDING TO FORECLOSE ON OUR PROPERTY. 

	Fifth. The Defendants cannot foreclose without a Judicial Determination of The Status of The Defendants as The Owner in a Court of Common Law and by Way of A Quiet Title Action.

The Defendants, by their actions are attempting to foreclose and force us out of the subject property without due process of law. Pursuant to the rules of the common law, the Defendants do not have the right to foreclose by way of a demand for insurance payments. This common law principal is reflected in California Civil Code 2924. The Defendants clearly violated this provision of California law when they started foreclosure proceedings by way of their demand for flood insurance payments. Pursuant to the Fifth Article of Amendment to our Federal Constitution, the Defendants cannot seek to obtain non-judicial remedies to obtain title, thereby claiming to have a ‘perfected title’, and thereby circumventing the due process requirements as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment, by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. The quiet title action must be adjudicated prior to any foreclosure action taken or being tried in court, see California Civil Code Section 2924, which requires a court order to precede the sale of a property in foreclosure. Any unlawful action taken by the Defendant must be preceded by a final judgment in an action to quiet title, and therefore their planned foreclosure is violative of our due process rights. The US Supreme Court also reaffirmed the right to enjoy private property and not be deprived of it without due process of law in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.; 405 US 538 (1972). The Defendant is proceeding as if rights were waived. We have never waived any rights in this matter, knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily, including our right to judicial due process, please see Brady v US; 397 US 742 at 748. In addition, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, in Article Two, requires that no one can be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. The Northwest Ordinance is still applicable today in California for the reasons stated previously. 

	The outcome of this quiet title case will determine the ownership of the property and the validity of the claims of the parties. The foreclosure action planned by the Defendant, M & T BANK lacks personal and subject matter jurisdiction because; 1.) of the misrepresentation of material facts by said Defendant that they have the right to foreclose 2.) the use of the all capitalized names as the straw man, 3.) the fact that the attempted seizure of the private property in question is not lawful because it violates the doctrine of due process established by California Common Law and by the US Supreme Court in Lynch v Household Finance, supra, by skipping and circumventing the requirement to file an Action to Quiet Title to determine with certainty who has title to the property and 5.) it violates our due process rights as Plaintiff in the Quiet Title Action. When a court proceeds in an action such as the unlawful detainer case for anything other than dismissal, under these circumstances, all of its judgments are void. 

“The jurisdiction of the court depends on the correctness of the allegation.” US  v Percheman (1833) 32 US 518 L.Ed.  604 at 617; “Where a court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment until reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court. But if it act without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void. “. Wilcox v Jackson; 13 Peters 264 (1839); quoting  Elliot et al v Piersol; 1 Peters 340.

Sixth. The Deed of Trust and Note are not valid because of Inherent Fraud in the Note and Deed of Trust.
The Defendants based their claim upon a mortgage contract (Note and Deed of Trust), which is in its very nature fraudulent. There is no valuable consideration in the existing mortgage contract, because there was nothing of intrinsic value loaned in the agreement. The mortgage company loaned Federal Reserve notes, which are commercial paper pursuant to a decision by the United States Supreme Court, see Clearfield Trust Company v US; 318 US 363. The mortgage contract violates Article One, Section Ten of the US Constitution and the Constitution for the united States of America. The mortgage contract violates The Coinage Act of 1792. In the united States of America, no state can make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debt, see Federal Const. Art. 1 Sec.10. Gold and silver coin has intrinsic value, and is exclusively lawful money in the united States of America. The Mortgage contract (note and deed of trust) did not provide for the loaning of gold and Silver coin, and did not provide for the repayment of the debt in gold and silver coin, as required under our Federal Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10, and is therefore not a lawful contract, because something other than gold and silver coin was made a tender in payment of debt.  The mortgage contract, note and deed of trust is unconstitutional, see Woodruff v. Mississippi; 162 US 291;16 S. Ct. 820; 40 L. Ed. 973; Julliard v Greenman; 110 US 421, at 447, 4 S Ct. 122, 28 L. Ed. 204, See also Knox v Lee; 79 US (12 Wall 457, 20 L. Ed 287.

The collection of this alleged debt is unconstitutional, see Julliard v Greenman; 110 US 421, at 447, 4 S Ct. 122, 28 L. Ed. 204, See also Knox v Lee; 79 US (12 Wall 457), 20 L. Ed 287; Woodruff v. Mississippi, 162 US 291, which states; “ For the power to borrow money, simply meant the power to borrow whatever was money according to the Constitution of the United States and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, and the power to issue negotiable bonds therefore included the power to make them payable in such money. This the law presumed, and to proceed on an implication to the contrary was to deny to the holders of these bonds, subsequent to their purchase, a right arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.” In two of the above cases, the US Supreme Court stated that the use of paper money was acceptable under the above-cited sections of the US Constitution, because the currency at the time of these rulings was backed by silver and gold coins. Woodruff v. Mississippi, and Article One, Section Ten of the US Constitution must be held as controlling in this matter as the supreme law of the land, since the court is required to be faithful to the law and cannot engage in judicial nullification.  

Seventh. The Defendants Cannot Validate the Debt, Therefore the obligation is extinguished, and any claim, by them, to the land is void. The Defendants agent and debt collectors failed to validate and verify the debt in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Title 15 USC, § 1692 and numerous sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, all of which are a reflection of the rules of the common law. In my constructive notice I offered to pay the Defendant, M & T if they would validate the debt and demonstrate that they have the right of subrogation. They have failed to respond to our constructive notice and are, therefore in default on our offer. As a result of the foregoing the obligation is extinquished, see Walker v. Houston; 215 Cal 742; 12 P2d 953 at 953, 87 A.L.R. 937. 

Eighth. The Defendants in this matter have not responded to my request to validate the debt as required in the Offer of Performance, therefore the obligation is extinguished, See Exhibit C. Please note the Defendants claim that they have the right to foreclose, however, the right of subrogation does not exist for the Defendant, M & T BANK, as a stranger to the transaction, pursuant to the case law below; see 73 Am Jur Second, Section 90 which states that a right of subrogation does not exist for a mere volunteer, or some one who has not paid the entire mortgage debt in full. Please review the following for affirmation that the right of subrogation does not exist; Henningsen  v. United States Fidelity & G. Co; Supra; Prairie State National Bank v. United States; Supra ; Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. v. Middleport; Supra; McBride v. McBride; Supra. AS A RESULT OF THE FOREGOING US SUPREME COURT RULINGS, THE DEFENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF SUBROGATION. THEREFORE, THEY CANNOT VALIDATE THE DEBT BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT THE ORIGINAL LENDER AND CANNOT ENFORCE THE NOTE THAT THEY CLAIM TO HAVE PURCHASED FROM THE ORIGINAL LENDER. 

In addition, the Defendants never proved that the full amount of the mortgage was paid further amplifying the fact that a right of subrogation does not exist. In most cases the mortgage companies and banks sell the notes to each other for pennies on the dollar, meaning that they do not pay the entire mortgage debt in full, thereby providing another reason why they do not have the right of subrogation. 

Ninth. We have a Common law Lien against the property which must be satisfied before any equity liens are satisfied, See Exhibit D. Common law liens in law supersede mortgages and equity liens, Drummond Carriage Co.v. Mills; 74 NW 966 (1898); Hewitt v. William; 47 La. Ann. 742;  17 So. 269; Carr v. Dail; 19 SE 235; MacMahon v. Lundin; 58 NW, 827; and may be satisfied only when a Court of Common Law pursuant to order of the elected Sheriff under of Article Seven of the Bill of Rights.

Tenth. The Uniform Commercial Code also reflects these principals of common law that once a debtor makes a good faith offer of performance and it is not accepted, the obligation is extinguished, pursuant to UCC 3-603. The Offer of Performance is the necessary instrument to cause the discharge of the alleged debt in this matter. Please note under the tender laws, if the payment is made and refused, the debt is discharged, please see UCC 3 - 603 and UCC 2-511. Also under The Truth in Lending Act, Title 15, Section 1601, Under Regulation Z the Defendant has to object to the tender of payment within three days or be barred from objecting later. See Nygaard v. Continental Resources, Inc; 598 N.W. 2d 851, 39 UCC 2d 851. As the Plaintiffs we have no other recourse or remedy. We offered to pay the entire debt in full if the Defendant, M & T BANK, would validate the debt, SEE EXHIBIT C, and prove that they have a right of subrogation. The Defendant, M & T BANK, did not accept our offer. The Defendant thereby violated our right to due process of law, by failing to either accept our conditional offer to pay the debt by validating the debt and proving that they have the right of subrogation or disclaiming any right, title or interest in the property. 

"A tender is an offer of performance, made with the intent to extinguish the obligation (Civil Code Section 1485) When properly made, has the effect of putting the other party in default if he refuses to accept it ," Wiesenberg v. Hirshorn, 97 Cal App. 532, 275, P 997; Lovetro V. Steers  234 Cal App. 2d 461, 44 Cal. Rptr. 604; Holland v. Paddock, 142 Cal App. 2d 534, 298 P 2d 587. “...The imposition of such conditions is waived by the offeree if he does not specifically point out the alleged defects in the tender. "  Civil Code Sec. 1501; Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 2076; Hohener v. Gauss (1963) 221 Cal. App. 2d 797, 34 Cal. Rptr. 656. "The rationale of the requirement of specific objection is that the offeror should be permitted to remedy any defects in his tender; the oferee is therefore not allowed to remain silent at the time of the tender and later surprise the offeror with hidden objections, " Thomassen v. Carr, (1967) 250 Cal. App. 2d 341, 350, 58 Cal Rptr. 297; Riverside Fence Co. v. Novak, (1969) 78 Cal. Rptr. 536; See Walker v. Houston; 215 Cal 742; 12 P2d 953 at 953, 87 A.L.R. 937. The Defendant never accepted my offer to pay the debt by failing to comply with my condition precedent. They did this by failing to prove that they have the right of subrogation and failing to validate the debt.

The Uniform Commercial Code also reflects these principals of common law that once a debtor makes a good faith offer of performance and it is not accepted, the obligation is extinguished, pursuant to UCC 3-603. The conditional offer to pay is the necessary instrument to cause the discharge of the Defendant’s Demand for Payment in this matter. Please note under the tender laws, if the payment is made and refused, the debt is discharged, Please see UCC 3 - 603 and UCC 2-511. See Nygaard v. Continental Resources, Inc; 598 N.W. 2d 851, 39 UCC 2d 851. As the Plaintiffs we have no other recourse or remedy other than this action to quiet title. 

The lender never produced a verified claim demonstrating that something of value or substance was loaned in the transaction. Therefore, the Defendants have no right to pursue this matter in court under Title 15 USC, Sections 1692 (g) and(e). 

The Defendants never produced a verified claim demonstrating that something of value or substance was loaned in the transaction. Therefore, the Defendant has no right to demand payment. Also our good faith offer of performance was not accepted and therefore the obligation is extinguished.

Eleventh. The rule of decision in California courts is common law.  Under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution for the united States of America, I am entitled to a common law trial by the jury, 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States of America 226 US 172, 50 at 52 Morris v United States 8 Wall. 507, 19 L. ed. 481 The Sarah 8 Wheat. 391, 5 L. Ed. 644 50 at 51 United States v. La Vengeance (reported in 3 Dall. 297, 1 L. Ed. 610) United States v The Sally (in 2 Cranch 406, 2 L. Ed 320 and United States v The Betsy (in 4 Cranch 443, 2 Led. 673). "An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." -- Norton vs. Shelby  County; 118, US 425 p. 442. See also, Miranda v. Arizona; 384 U.S. 436 (1966)  “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them” emphasis mine.

On dry land, any action must be adjudicated under common law pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. According to the US Supreme Court, in 443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States of America; Supra, the US Supreme Court stated as follows; “The 7th Amendment to the Constitution preserves the right of trial by jury in suits at common law involving more than $20, and provides that no fact tried by a jury, shall be reviewed otherwise than according to the rules of the common law.” The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also requires a common law court pursuant to Article Two, since the State of California is bound by the compact under the equal footing doctrine as a state on an equal footing with the states such as Illinois or Wisconsin formed from the Northwest Territories, see Wilcox v Jackson; 13 Peters 264 (1839). It should be further noted that California was admitted into the union on an equal footing with such states as Illinois and Indiana, states, which were admitted under the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.

Twelfth. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act must be adhered to in California, as in all other jurisdictions in the United States and the United States of America. If a debt cannot be validated by the creditor, it is unenforceable and the creditor must cease and desist all collection activities pursuant to Title 15, § 1692(g). A notice by the debtor that the debt is being disputed is all that is needed to compel the creditor to stop collecting the debt until debt validation has been completed. See Clarks Jeweler’s v. Humble, 823 P 2d 818, 16 Kan App 2d 366 (1991). Furthermore, all collection agencies and debt collectors include a clause in their collection notices, which is a notice to the debtor that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt. This provides tacit acknowledgment that the debt collectors must comply with Title 15, § 1692 et seq. The debt collectors cannot identify anything of substance or value loaned in the transaction and therefore cannot validate the debt. Be advised that “verification” is defined (in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition) as follows: “Confirmation of correctness, truth, or authenticity by affidavit, oath, or deposition. Affidavit of truth of matter stated and object of verification is to assure good faith in averments or statements of party.”

Thirteenth. The Defendant, M & T BANK, has no right to lend credit as this is a violation of their corporate charter and violates Federal law, and is prohibited under the doctrine of ultra vires. 
	The United States Supreme Court and the lower courts have long recognized that the banks cannot loan credit.   
	“In the federal courts, it is well established that a national bank has not       
power to lend its credit to another by becoming surety, endorser, or guarantor for   
him.” Farmers and Miners Bank v. Bluefield Nat 'l Bank, 11 F 2d 83, 271 U.S. 669.

 "A national bank has no power to lend its credit to any person or corporation.”
. . . Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank, 94 F 925 36 CCA 553, certiorari denied in 20 S.Ct 1024, 176 US 682, 44 LED 637.

	 “The doctrine of ultra vires is a most powerful weapon to keep private corporation within their legitimate spheres and to punish them for violations of their corporate charters, and it probably is not invoked too often .. .”  Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank, 103 Wis 125, 79 NW 229.  American Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW 430.

	“A bank may not lend its credit to another even though such a transaction turns
out to have been of benefit to the bank, and in support of this a list of cases 
might be cited, which-would look like a catalog of ships.” [Emphasis added] Norton Grocery Co. v. Peoples Nat. Bank, 144 SE 505. 151 Va 195.
 
	"It has been settled beyond controversy that a national bank, under federal
Law being limited in its powers and capacity, cannot lend its credit by guaranteeing
the debts of another. All such contracts entered into by its officers are ultra 
vires . . ." Howard & Foster Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Union, 133 SC
202, 130 SE 759(1926).

	"Neither, as included in its powers not incidental to them, is it a part of
a bank's business to lend its credit. If a bank could lend its credit as well as
its money, it might, if it received compensation and was careful to put its name
only to solid paper, make a great deal more than any lawful interest on its money
would amount to. If not careful, the power would be the mother of panics, . . . 
Indeed, lending credit is the exact opposite of lending money, which is the real
business of a bank, for while the latter creates a liability in favor of the bank,
the former gives rise to a liability of the bank to another. I Morse. Banks and 
Banking 5th Ed. Sec 65; Magee, Banks and Banking, 3rd Ed. Sec 248." American
Express Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 194 NW 429.

 	"It is not within those statutory powers for a national bank, even though solvent,
to lend its credit to another in any of the various ways in which that might be 
done." Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. L 'Herrison, 33 F 2d 841, 842 (1929).

 "There is no doubt but what the law is that a national bank cannot lend its credit or become an accommodation endorser." National Bank of Commerce v. Atkinson, 55 E 471.

"A bank can lend its money, but not its credit." First Nat'l Bank of Tallapoosa
v. Monroe. 135 Ga 614, 69 SE 1124, 32 LRA (NS) 550.

 ".. . the bank is allowed to hold money upon personal security; but it must
be money that it loans, not its credit." Seligman v. Charlottesville Nat. Bank,
3 Hughes 647, Fed Case No.12, 642, 1039.

  "A loan may be defined as the delivery by one party to, and the receipt by
another party of, a sum of money upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay
the sum with or without interest." Parsons v. Fox; 179 Ga 605, 176 SE 644. Also
see Kirkland v. Bailey, 155 SE 2d 701 and United States v. Neifert White Co., 247
Fed Supp 878, 879.

	Fourteenth. A party alleging to be creditor must prove standing.
The Defendants have failed or refused to produce the actual note, which the Defendants allege that we owe. Where the foreclosing party cannot prove the existence of the note, then there is no note. To recover on a promissory note, the Defendant must prove: (1) the existence of the note in question; (2) that the party sued signed the note; (3) that the Defendant is the owner or holder of the note; and (4) that a certain balance is due and owing on the note.  See In Re: SMS Financial LLC. v. Abco Homes, Inc. . No.98-50117  February 18, 1999 (5th Circuit Court of Appeals.) Volume 29 of the New Jersey Practice Series, Chapter 10 Section 123, page 566, emphatically states, “ ...; and no part payments should be made on the bond or note unless the person to whom payment is made is able to produce the bond or note and the part payments are endorsed thereon.  It would seem that the mortgagor would normally have a Common law right to demand production or surrender of the bond or note and mortgage, as the case may be. See Restatement, Contracts S 170(3), (4) (1932); C.J.S. Mortgages S 469  in Carnegie Bank v Shalleck ; 256 N.J. Super 23 (App. Div  1992), the Appellate Division held, “When the underlying mortgage is evidenced by an instrument meeting the criteria for negotiability set forth in N.J.S. 12A:3-104, the holder of the instrument shall be afforded all the rights and protections provided a holder in due course pursuant to N.J.S. 12A:3-302" Since no one is able to produce the “instrument”  there is no competent evidence before the Court  that any party is the holder of the alleged note or the true holder in due course. New Jersey common law dictates that the plaintiff prove the existence of the alleged note in question, prove that the party sued signed the alleged note, prove that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the alleged note, and prove that certain balance is due and owing on any alleged note.  Federal Circuit Courts have ruled that the only way to prove the perfection of any security is by actual possession of the security. See Matter of Staff Mortg. & Inv. Corp.,  550 F.2d 1228 (9th  Cir 1977),  “Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the only notice sufficient to inform all interested parties that a security interest in instruments has been perfected is actual possession by the secured party, his agent or bailee.”  Bankruptcy Courts have followed the Uniform Commercial Code. In Re Investors & Lenders, Ltd. 165 B.R. 389 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J.1994), “Under the New Jersey Uniform Commercial Code (NJUCC), promissory note is “instrument,”  security interest in which must be perfected by possession .

Fifteenth. In order to prove damages in foreclosure of a debt, a party must enter the account and general ledger statement into the record through a competent fact witness.
To prove up a claim of damages, the foreclosing party must enter evidence incorporating records such as a general ledger and accounting of an alleged unpaid promissory note, the person responsible for preparing and maintaining the account general ledger must provide a complete accounting which must be sworn to and dated by the person who maintained the ledger.  See  Pacific Concrete F.C.U. V. Kauanoe,   62 Haw.334, 614 P.2d 936 (1980),  GE Capital Hawaii, Inc. v. Yonenaka  25 P.3d 807,96 Hawaii 32, (Hawaii App 2001), Fooks v. Norwich Housing Authority; 28 Conn.L. Rptr. 371, (Conn. Super.2000), and Town of Brookfield v. Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc.; 513 A.2d 1218, 201  (1986). See also Solon v. Godbole;
163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 114 Il.

Sixteenth. The Defendant, M & T BANK, has not incurred a financial loss in the lending of Federal Reserve Notes. Exhibit B proves the factual lack of any financial loss or any assets of the alleged creditor pledged in the transaction. As anyone reviewing this exhibit can see, the banks in the United States of America create money at no cost to themselves. Please see page 23 Question number 125. The statement by the House Banking Committee is as follows; “The business of banks is to lend money. The profit comes from the difference between the cost of creating money and the price they charge borrowers for that money. Now the cost of creating money is negligible. Congress has delegated the power to create money to the banking system without a charge. The banks do not pay a license fee or a payment charge for their reserves. Thus the raw materials the banks use cost them nothing.”  Emphasis added. Thus the Defendant, M & T BANK, cannot allege that they incurred a financial loss, and they have no standing to or foundation to allege that they will incurr a financial loss, based upon the above statement issued by the House Banking Committee.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Slander of Title, fraudulent conversion) 
	First. We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, hereby allege and re-allege all of the foregoing Paragraphs as part of this Cause of Action with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. Based upon the foregoing the Defendants are slandering title to the subject property, and is attempting an act of fraudulent conversion. The Defendants has a duty to refrain from attempting to foreclose when they lack the right of subrogation. We ask the court to provide declaratory relief to order the defendants to cease and desist and abate any attempt to conduct a foreclosure sale, abate, curtail, cease and desist any collection activities and foreclosure activities by the defendants for lack of due process lack of a claim filed against the original land patent, and breach of contract. The Defendant, M & T BANK, has not produced any evidence whatsoever that they are a co-signer on the original promissory note. The Defendant, M & T BANK, has, therefore, no right of subrogation and no right to foreclose on our property. The Defendant, M & T BANK, has never produced any evidence that they have paid the entire mortgage debt in full, thereby failing to prove a second element that is required of someone who is claiming to have a right of subrogation, as discussed above. The Defendant, M & T BANK, therefore, has no right of subrogation as a stranger to the original transaction and as someone who has not paid the entire mortgage debt in full. See Aetna Life v. Middleport, 124 US 534. In an action to annul a promissory note and deed of trust which were then in the hands of an assignee, evidence supported findings that foreclosure during litigation would produce great or irreparable injury to the plaintiffs and therefore issuance of a preliminary injunction restraining assignees from disposing of a note and deed or from foreclosing was not an abuse of discretion, see;  Daniels v. Williams; 270 P. 2d 556, 125 C.A. 2d 310. In this case we are not asking for a restraining order, however we are asking for an order to cease and desist.

	Second. The Defendants have never produced the following; A.) evidence of a lien, a security interest or some kind of right, title or interest in the property or any sort of claim that is superior to our own, based upon a right of subrogation and upon valuable consideration and a judgment by a common law court, WHICH IS REQUIRED UNDER CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 2924 PRIOR TO ANY ATTEMPT TO FORECLOSURE AND SELL THE PROPERTY; This is also required by the rules of the common law, pursuant to the Seventh Amendment, see  443 Cans of Frozen Egg Product v United States of America; supra and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787; and B.) to identify the valuable consideration or lawful money that gives them power to enforce the original mortgage contract.

	Therefore, Under the doctrine of laches the Defendants are barred from now claiming to have a right of subrogation and thereby any right, title or interest in the property or a lien or a security interest over us, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, the Plaintiffs, or our private property described in Exhibit A. Under the principal of estoppel by silence, the Defendant, M & T BANK remains silent and still does not respond to the constructive notice or issues of law raised in the constructive notice. 

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(fraud, fraudulent inducement, insurance fraud)

We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, hereby allege and re-allege all of the foregoing Paragraphs as part of this Cause of Action with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. The Defendant, M & T BANK, has used heavy pressure, threats and intimidation to pay for flood insurance, which was not required under the note and deed of trust. Nowhere in the note and deed of trust was there a provision or clause placing a requirement on the borrowers to obtain flood insurance. By way of fraudulent inducement, the Defendant, M & T BANK demanded that we purchase flood insurance. Through their invoices, the Defendant M & T BANK attempted to mislead us into believing that we are required to pay for flood insurance in spite of the fact that there is no lawful provision written into the note and deed of trust requiring such a purchase of flood insurance. The Defendant M & T BANK has a duty to refrain from requiring us to buy or pay for insurance that is not required under any written or oral agreement.     

Additionally, the Defendant M & T BANK has no right to demand that any insurance be purchased by the Plaintiffs, because they are a stranger to the transaction and have no right of subrogation. 

Request For Relief

	Wherefore, we, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, the Plaintiffs, pray for a judgment against the Defendants as follows:
One.  For abatement of any and all past, current and future claims of any right, title or interest in the property, abatement of demands for mortgage payments, current past and future, discharge of any current or past demands for payment and we ask that the Defendants be ordered to remove the property described in Exhibit A from any list of assets on their books, and remove any records of this fraudulent debt with credit reporting agencies. We further ask that the unlawful PLANS taken by the defendants to place the property for sale to the public in an unlawful foreclosure proceeding, in violation of the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, and California common law be abated and that they cease and desist their actions and activities in pursuance thereof.

Two. For a judgment that because the above described property is held in alloidum by  us, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, The Plaintiffs, and that no superior title exists by anyone, including the defendants, and defendants have no security interest, right, title or interest or lien in said private allodial property, the defendants must be found to be without any lawful claim against our private allodial property, and be compelled to disclaim any right title or interest in the subject property.

Three. For an order of Cease and Desist, ordering the Defendants and their agents, including any unregistered foreign agents, to cease and desist any further actions to foreclose on this alleged debt, because of the failure of consideration and because of the lack of the right of subrogation, and therefore, the lack of any standing to sue for foreclosure or for unlawful detainer by the Defendants. In addition, We ask for a court order of Cease and Desist ordering the Sheriff to refrain from enforcing any and all actions for unlawful detainer or foreclosure, taken by this Defendant, M & T BANK, or their agents and assigns, because they do not have the right of subrogation as a stranger to the transaction. 

Punitive and Compensatory Damages
We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, hereby allege and re-allege all of the foregoing Paragraphs as part of this Cause of Action with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein. We, Gail-Joy-Bennett: Wofford, Dana E. Wofford and Mark-Evan: Bennett, the Plaintiffs in this matter further seek costs and fees from Defendant, M & T BANK, if the Defendants do not immediately stop their foreclosure on our allodial property in the amount of two hundred and fifty dollars in lawful money, silver specie, silver one ounce coins, minted in the united states of America and punitive and compensatory compensation for the costs of this suit intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Plaintiff M & T BANK in the amount of two hundred and fifty dollars of lawful money, silver specie, silver one ounce coins minted in the United States of America, sum certain. We ask for compensation and damages from M & T BANK. We ask for no compensation or damages from the Lake County Sheriff. 

Signed in the fourth century of the independence of the united States of America. All rights specifically reserved.
Respectfully submitted, 

							

							

					Verification

	We have read the Action to Quiet Title  to Private Allodial Property And For Declaratory Relief and know the contents thereof to be true; and the same is true of our own knowledge, except to the matters which are therein stated on our information and belief, and as to those matters we believe them to be true. The foregoing is true, correct, complete and not misleading.

Sealed by the voluntary act of My own hand on this                                                    day of the 				 month, in the Year of our Lord, two thousand and eight, in the fourth century of the Independence of America. 

 Gail-Joy-Bennett-Bennett: Wofford

Dana-Elliot: Wofford					

Mark-Evan: Bennett

LIST OF EXHIBITS 

A.  DEED

B. HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE REPORT

C. REQUEST FOR VALIDATION OF DEBT LETTER/
DEED OF RELEASE
D. COMMON LAW LIEN

				

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