particular were discussed. As Senator Edwards states; But, said, he, it is not my purpose to discuss, at length, the merits of the proposed change. I will, at present, content myself with an effort, merely, to shield the present settlers upon public lands from merciless speculators, whose cupidity and avarice would unquestionably be tempted by the improvements which those settlers have made with the sweat of their brows, and to which they have been encouraged by the conduct of the government itself, for though they might be considered as embraced by the letter of the law which provides against intrusion on public lands, yet, that their case has not been considered by the Government as within the mischiefs intended to be prevented is manifest, not only from the forbearance to enforce the law, but from the positive rewards which others, in their situation, have received, by the several laws which have heretofore been granted to them by the same right if preemption which I now wish extended to the present settlers. Id. at 456.

Further, Senator King from New York stated; He considered the change as highly favorable to the poor man; and he argued at some length, that it was calculated to plant in the new country a population of independent, unembarrassed freeholders; ... that it would cut up speculation and monopoly; that the money paid for the lands would be carried from the State or country from which the purchaser should remove; that it would prevent the accumulation of an alarming debt, which experience proved never would and never could be paid.  Id. at 456-457.

In other statutes, the Court recognized much of these same ideas. In United States v. Reynes, 9 How. (U.S.) 127 (1850), the Supreme Court stated: The object of the Legislature is manifest. It was intended to prevent speculation by dealing for rights of preference before the public lands were in the market. The speculator acquired power over choice spots, by procuring occupants to seat themselves on them and who abandoned them as soon as the land was entered under their preemption right, and the speculation accomplished. Nothing could be mote

easily done than this, if contracts of this description could be enforced. The act of 1830, however, proved to be of little avail; and then came the Act of 1835 (5 Stat 251) which compelled the preemptor to swear that he had not made an arrangement by which the title might insure to the benefit of anyone except himself, or that he would transfer it to another at any subsequent time. This was preliminary to the allowing of his entry, and discloses the policy of Congress. Id. at 154.

‘It is always to be borne in mind, in construing a congressional grant, that the act by which it is made is a law as well as a conveyance and that such effect must be given to it as will carry out the intent of Congress. That intent should not be defeated by applying to the grant the rules of common law ... words of present grant, are operative, if at all, only as

contracts to convey. But the rules of common law must yield in this, as in other cases, to the legislative will.” Missouri Kansas & Texas Railway Company v. Kansas Pacific Railway Company, 97 U.S. 491, 497 (1878). The administration of the land system in this country is vested in the Executive Department of the Government, first in the Treasury and now in the Interior Department. The officers charged with the disposal of the public domain under the authority of acts of Congress are required and empowered to determine the construction of those acts so far as it relates to the extent and character of the rights claimed under them, and to be given, though their actions, to —individuals. This is a portion of the Political power of the Government, and courts of justice must never interfere with it Marks v Dickson, 61 U.S. (20 How) 501 (1857); see also Cousin v Blanc’s Ex., 19 How. (U.S.) 206, 209 (1856). "The power of Congress to dispose of its land cannot be interfered with, or its exercise embarrassed by any State legislation; nor can such legislation deprive the grantees of the United States of the possession and enjoyment of the property granted by reason of any delay in the transfer of the title after the initiation of proceedings for its acquisition." Gibsion v Chouteau, 13 Wal. (U.S.) 92, 93 (1871).

State statutes that give lesser authoritative ownership of title than the patent can not even be brought into federal court. Langdon v. Sherwood, 124 U.S. 74, 81 (1887). These acts of

Congress making grants are not to be treated both law and grant, and the intent of Congress, when ascertained, is to control in the interpretation of the law. Wisconsin R.R. Co. v. Forsythe, 159 U.S. 46 (1895). The intent to be searched for by the courts in a government patent is the intent which the government had at that time, and not what it would have been had no mistake been made. The true meaning of a binding expression in a patent must be applied, no matter where such expressions an found in the document. It should be construed as to effectuate the primary object Congress bad in view; and obviously a construction that gives effect to a patent is to be preferred to one that renders it inoperative and void. A grant must be interpreted by the law of the country in force at the time when it was made. The construction of federal grant by a state court is necessarily controlled by the federal decisions on the same subject. The United States may dispose of the public lands on such terms and conditions, and subject to such restrictions and limitations as in its judgment will best promote the public welfare, even if the condition is to exempt the land from sale on execution issued or judgment recovered in a State Court for a debt contracted before the patent issues. Miller v. Little, 47 Cal. 348, 350 (1874). Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of titles emanating from the United States and the whole legislation of the Government must be examined in the determination of such titles. Begneu v. Broderick, 38 U.S. 436 (1839). It was clearly the policy of Congress, in passing the preemption and patent laws,

to confer the benefits of those laws to actual settlers upon the land. Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 Ill. 607, 617 (1890). The intent of Congress is manifest in the determinations of meaning, force and power vested in the patent. These cases all illustrate the power and dignity given to the patent. It was created to divest the government of its lands, and to act as a means of conveying such lands to the generations of people that would occupy those lands. This formula, ‘or his legal representatives,” embraces representatives of the original grantee in the land, by contract, such as assignees or grantees, as well as by operation of law, and leaves the question open to inquiry in a court of justice as to the party to whom the patent, or confirmation, should enure. Hogan v. Page, 69 U.S. 605 (1864). The patent was and-is the document and law that protects the settler from the merciless speculators, from the people that use avarice to unjustly benefit themselves against an unsuspecting nation. The patent was created with these high and grand intentions, and was created with such intentions for a sound reason.

The settlers as a rule seem to have been poor persons, and presumably without the necessary funds to improve and pay for their land, but it appears that in every case where the settlement was made under the preemption law, the settler ... entered and paid for the land at the expiration of the shortest period at which the entry could be made...” Close v. Stuyvesant, 132 Ill. 607, 623 (1890). We must look to the beneficent character of the acts that

created these grants and patents and the peculiar objects they were intended to protect and secure. A class of enterprising, hardy and most meritorious and valuable citizens have become the pioneers in the settlement and improvement of the new and distant lands of the government. McConnell v. Wilcox, I Scam.(Ill.) 344, 367 (1837). “In furtherance of what is deemed a wise policy, tending to encourage settlement, and to develop the resources of the country, it invites the heads of families to occupy small parcels of the public land ... To deny Congress the power to make a valid and effective contract of this character ... would materially abridge its power of disposal, and seriously interfere with a favorite policy of the government, which fosters measures tending to a distribution of the lands to actual settlers at a nominal price.’ Miller v. Little, 47 Cal. 348, 351 (1874). The legislative acts, the Statutes at Lange, enacted to divest the United States of its land and to sell that land to the true sovereigns of this republic, had very distinct intents. Congress recognized that the average settler of this nation would have little money, therefore Congress built into the patent, and its corresponding act, the understanding that these lands were to be free from avarice and cupidity, free from the speculators who preyed on the unsuspecting nation, and forever under the control and ownership of the freeholder, who by the sweat of his brow made the land produce the food that would feed himself and eventually the nation. Even today, the intent of Congress is to maintain a cheap food supply though the retention of the sovereign farmers on the land. United States v Kimball Foods,

Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see also Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (1982). Originally, the intent of Congress was to protect the sovereign freeholders and create a permanent system of land ownership in the country. Today, the intent of Congress is to retain the small family farm and utilize the cheap production of these situations, it has been necessary to protect the sovereign on his parcel of land, and ensure that he remain in that position. The land patent and the patent acts were created to accomplish these goals. In other words, the patent or title deed being regular in its form, the law will not presume that such was obtained through fraud of the public right. This principle is ‘not merely an arbitrary rule of law established by the courts, rather it is a doctrine which is founded upon reason and the soundest principles of public policy. It is one which has been adopted in the interest of peace in the society and the permanent security of titles. Unless fraud is shown, this rule is held to apply to patents executed by the public authorities. State v. Hewitt Land Co., 134 P. 474, 479 (1913). It is therefore necessary to determine exact power and authority contained in a patent.

Legal titles to lands cannot be conveyed except in the form provided by law. McGarrahan v. Mining Co., 96 U.S. 316 (1877). Legal title to property is contingent upon the patent issuing from the government. Sabo v. Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Aka. 1976).

"That the patent carries the fee and is the best title known to a court of law is the settled doctrine of this court. Marshall v. Ladd, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 106 (1869).

“A patent issued by the government of the United States is legal and conclusive evidence of title to the land described therein. No equitable interest, however strong, to land described in such a patent, can prevail at law, against the patent.” Land Patents, Opinions of the United States Attorney General’s office, (September, 1969).

“A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive against the government and all claiming under junior patents’ or titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal." Stone v. United States, 2 Wall. (67 U.S.) 765 (1865).

The patent is the instrument which, under the laws of Congress, passes title from the United States and the patent when regular on its face, is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee. When there is a confrontation between two parties as to the superior legal title, the patent is conclusive evidence as to ownership. Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 912 (1871).

Congress having the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of its titles has declared the patent to be the superior and conclusive evidence of the legal title. Bagnell v. Brodrick, 38 U.S.	438 (1839).

“Issuance of a government patent granting title to land is the most accredited type of conveyance known to our law’."  United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 111 (1935); see also United States v. Cherokee Nation, 474 F.2d 628, 634 (1973).

“The patent is prima facie conclusive evidence of the title.” Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. 223, 233 (1850).

“A patent, once issued, is the highest evidence of title, and is a final determination of the existence of all facts.” Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121, 123 (10th Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Beaman, 242 F. 876 (1917); File v. Alaska, 593 P.268, 270 (1979)

(When the federal government grants land via a patent, the patent is the highest evidence of title). Patent rights to the land is the title in fee, City of Los Angeles v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 292 P.2d 539 (1956), the patent of the fee simple, Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 16 (1956), and the patent is required to carry the fee. Carter v. Rubby, 166 U.S. 493, 496 (1896); see also Klais v. Danowski, 129 N.W. 2d 414, 422 (1964) (Interposition of the patent or interposition of the f cc title). The land patent is the muniment of title, such title being absolute in its nature, making the sovereigns absolute freeholders on their lands. Finally, the patent is the only evidence of the legal fee simple title. McConnell v. Wilcox, 1 Scam (ILL.) 381, 396 (1837).

All these various cases and quotes illustrate one statement that should be thoroughly understood at this time, the patent is the highest evidence of title and is conclusive of the ownership of land in courts of competent jurisdiction. This however, does not examine the methods or possibilities of challenging a land patent.

In Hooper et al. v. Scheimer, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 235 (1859), the United States Supreme Court stated, “I affirm that a patent is unimpeachable at law, except, perhaps, when it appears on its own face to be void; and the authorities on this point are so uniform and unbroken in the counts, Federal and State, that little else will be necessary beyond a reference to them.” Id. at 240 (1859). A patent cannot be declared void at law, nor can a party travel behind the patent to avoid it. Id. A patent cannot be avoided at law in a collateral proceeding unless it is declared void by statute, or its nullity indicated by some equally explicit statutory denunciations. Id. One perfect on its face is not to be avoided, in a trail at law, by anything save an elder patent. It is not to be affected by evidence or circumstances which might show that the impeaching party might prevail in a court of equity. Id. at 243. A patent is evidence, in a court of law, of the regularity of all previous steps to it, and no facts behind it can be investigated. Id. A patent cannot be collaterally avoided at law, even for fraud. Id. at 245. A patent, being a superior title, must of course, prevail over colors of title; nor is it proper for any state legislation to give such titles, which are only equitable in nature with a recognized legal status in equity courts, precedence over the legal title in a court of law. Id. at 246. The Hooper case has many of the maxims that apply to the powers and possible disabilities of a land patent, however there is extensive case law in the area.

The presumptions arise, from the existence of a patent, evidencing a grant of land from the United States, that all acts have been performed and all facts have been shown, which are prerequisites to its issuance, and that the right of the party, grantee therein, to have it issued, has been presented and passed upon by the proper authorities. Green v. Barber, 66 N.W. 1032 (1896). As stated in Bovier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 1834 (1914): Misrepresentations knowingly made by the application for a patent will justify the government in proceedings to set it aside, as it has a right to demand a cancellation of a patent obtained by false and fraudulent misrepresentations. United States v. Manufacturing Co., 128 U.S. 673 (1888); but courts of equity cannot set aside, annul, or correct patents or other evidence of title obtained from the United States by fraud or mistake, unless on specific averment of the mistake or fraud, supported by clear and satisfactory proof, Maxelll Land Grant Cancellation, 11 How. (U.S.) 552 (1850); although a patent fraudulently obtained by one knowing at the time that another person has a prior right to the land may be set aside by an information in the nature of a bill in equity filed by the attorney of the United States for the district in which the land lies; Id. A court of equity, upon a bill filed for that purpose, will vacate a patent of the United States for a tract of land obtained by mistake from the officers of the land office, in order that a clear title may be transferred to the previous purchaser; Hughes v. United States, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 232 (1866); but a patent for land of the United States will not be declared void merely because the evidence to authorize its issue is deemed insufficient by the court; Milliken v  Starling’s lessee, 16 Ohio 61. A state can impeach the title conveyed by it to a grantee only by a bill in chancery to cancel it, either for fraud on the part of the grantee or mistake of law; and until4 so canceled it cannot issue to any other party a valid patent for the same land. Chandler v. Manufacturing Co., 149 U.S. 79 (1893).

Other cases espouse these and other rules of law. A patentee can be deprived of his rights only by direct proceedings instituted by the government or by parties acting in its name, or by persons having a superior title to that acquired through the government. Putnum v. Ickes, 78 F.2d 233, cert denied 296 U.S. 612 (1935).

It is not sufficient for the one challenging a patent to show that the patentee should not have received the patent; he must also show that he, as the challenger, is entitled to it. Kale v. United States, 489 F.2d 449, 454 (1973).

A United States patent is protected from easy third party