manors or fiefs), held title by fee simple absolute;

(3)	this fee simple absolute provided the means by which the “supposed” owner could devise, alienate, or pass by inheritance the estates of land (manors or fiefs);

(4)	this fee simple absolute in feudal England, being not the full title, did not protect the “owner” if the King found disfavor with the “owner’;

(5)	the “owner” therefore had to pay a type of homage to ‘the King or a higher baron each year to discharge the obligation of his fief;

(6)	this homage of his fief could take the form of a revenue or tax, an amount of grain, or a set and permanent amount of money,

(7)	and therefore as long as the “owner” of the fief in f cc simple absolute paid homage to the king or sovereign, who held the entire country under an allodial title, then the “owner” could remain on. the property with full rights to sell, devise or pass it by inheritance as if the property was really his.
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SECTION II

LAND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA TODAY

THE AMERICAN FEUDALISTIC SOCIETY

The private ownership of land in America is one of those rights people have proclaimed to be essential in maintaining this republic. The necessary question in discussing this topic however, is whether ownership of land in America today really is a true and complete ownership of land under an allodial concept, or is it something much different. In other words, are we living in an actual allodial freehold or are we living in an updated version of feudalistic Common-Law. The answer is crucial in determining what rights we have in the protection of our realty against improper seizures and encumbrances by our government and creditors. The answer appears to be extremely clear upon proper reflection of our rights when payments are missed on mortgages, or taxes, for whatever reason, are not paid. If mortgage payments are missed or taxes are not paid, we actually fall into disfavor with the parties who have the power, and these powers, through court proceedings or otherwise, take our land as a penalty. When one understands if he is unable to perform as the government or his creditors request and for such failures of performance his land can be forfeited, then he can begin to understand exactly what type of land-ownership system controls his life, and be should recognize the inherent unjustness of such constitutional violations.

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The American—based system of land ownership today consists of three key requirements. These three are the warranty deed or some other type of deed purporting to convey ownership of land, title abstracts to chronologically follow the development of these different types of deeds to a piece of property, and title insurance to protect the ownership of that land. These three ingredients must work together to ensure a systematic and orderly conveyance of a piece of property; none of these three by itself can act to completely convey possession of the land from one person to another. At least two of the three are always deemed necessary to adequately satisfy the legal system and real estate agents that the titles to the property had been placed in the hands of the purchaser and often-times, all three are necessary to properly pass the ownership of the land to the purchaser. Yet does the absolute title and therefore the ownership of the land really pass from the seller to purchaser with the use of any one of these three instruments or in any combination thereof? None of the three by itself passes the absolute or allodial title to the land, the system of land ownership America originally operated under, and even combined all three can not convey this absolute type of ownership. What then is the function of these three instruments that are used in land conveyances and what type of title is conveyed by the three? Since the abstract only traces the title and the title insurance only insures the title, the most important and therefore first group to examine are the deeds that purportedly convey the fee from seller to purchaser.

These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed, quit claim deed, sheriffs deed, trustee’s deed, judicial deed, tax deed, wig or any other instrument that purportedly conveys the title. All of these documents state that it conveys the ownership to the land. Each of these, however, is actually a color of title. G. Thompson, Title to Real Property, Preparation and examination of Abstracts, Ch. 3, Section 73, p.93 (1919). A color of title is that which in appearance is title, but which in reality is not title. Wright v Mattison, 18 How. (U.S.) 50 (1855). In fact, any instrument may constitute color of title when it purports to convey the title of the land, as well the land itself, although it is void as a muniment of title. Joiplin Brewing Co. ‘V Payne, 197 No. 422, 94 S.W. 896 (1906). The Supreme Court of Missouri has stated, ‘that [w]hen we say a person has a color of title, whatever may be the meaning of the phrase, we express the idea, at least, that some act has been previously done,..., by which some title, good or bad, to a parcel of land of definite extent had been conveyed to him.” St. Louis v Gorman, 29 Mo. 593 (1860). In other words, a color of title is an appearance or apparent title, and “image” of the true title, hence the phrase “color of”, which, when coupled with possession purports to convey the ownership of the land to the purchaser. This however does not say that the color of title is the actual and true title itself, nor does it say that the color of title itself actually conveys ownership. In fact, the claimant or holder of a color of title is not even required to trace the title through the chain down to his instrument. Rawson v Fox, 65 Ill.
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200 (1872). Rather it may be said that a color of title is prima facie evidence of ownership of and rights to possession of land until such time as that presumption of ownership is disproved by a better title or the actual title itself. If such cannot be proven to the contrary, then ownership of the land is assumed to have passed to occupier of the land. To further strengthen a color titleholder’s position, courts have held that the good faith of the holder to a color of title is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. David v Hall, 92 Ill. 85 (1879); see also Morrison v Norman, 47 Ill. 477 (1868); and McConnell v Street, 17 Ill. 253 (1855).

With such knowledge of what a color of title is, it is interesting what constitutes colors of title. A warranty deed is like any other deed of conveyance. Mahrenholz v County Board of School Trustees of Lawrence Coun~y1 et. al., 93 Ill, app. 3d 366 (1981). A warranty deed or deed of conveyance is a color of title, as stated in Demosey v Burns, 281 Ill. 644, 650 (1917) (Deeds constitute colors of title); see also Dryden v Newman, 116 111. 186 (1886) (A deed that purports to convey interest in the land is a color of title); Hinckley v Green, 52 Ill. 223 (1869) (A deed which, on its face, purports~to convey a title, constitutes a claim and color of title); Busch v Huston, 75 Ill. 343 (1874); Chicking v Failes, 26 Ill. 508 (1861). A quit claim deed is a color of title as stated in Safford v Stubbs, 117 ILL. 389 (1886); see also Hooway v Clark, 27 ILL. 483 (1861) and McCellan v Kellogg, 17 Ill.
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498 (1855). Quit claim deeds can pass the title as effectively as a warrant with full covenants. Grant v Bennett, 96 Ill. 513, 525 (1880); See also Morgan v Clayton, 61 Ill. 35 (1871); Brady v spurck, 27 Ill. 478 (1861); Butterfield v Smith, 11 Ill. 485 (1849). Sheriffs deeds also are colors of title. Kendrick v Latham, 25 Fla. 819 (1889); as is a judicial deed, Huls v Buntin, 47 111. 396 (1865). The Illinois Supreme Court went into detail in its determination that a tax deed is only color of title. “There the complainant seem to have relied upon the tax deed as conveying to him the fee, and to sustain such a bill, it was incumbent of him to show that all the requirements of the law had beec complied with.” A simple tax deed by itself is only a color of title. Fee simple can only be acquired though adverse possession via payment of taxes; claim and color of title, plus seven years of payment of taxes. Thus any tax deed purports, on its face, to convey title is a good color of title. Walker v Converse, 148 Ill. 622, 629 (1894); see also Peadro v Carriker, 168 Ill. 570 (1897); Chicago v Middlebrooke, 143 Ill. 265 (1892); Piatt County v Gooden, 97 Ill.	84 (1880);	Stubblefield v Borders, 92 Ill. 570 (1897);

Coleman v Billings, 89 Ill. 183 (1878); Whitney v Stevens, 89 Ill. 53 (1878); Thomas v Eckard, 88 III. 593 (1878); Hollowav v Clarke, 27 Ill. 483 (1861). A will passes only a color of title. Baldwin v Ratcliff, 125 Ill. 376 (1888); Bradley v Rees, 113 Ill. 327 (1885) (A wig can pass only so much as the testator owns, though it may attempt to pass more). A trustee’s deed, a mortgages and strict foreclosure, Chickerin~ v Failes, 26 Ill. 508, 519

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(1861), or any document defining the extent of a disseisor’s claim or purported claim, Cook v Norton, 43 Ill. 391 (1867), all have been held to be colors of title. In fact, “(t]here is nothing here requiring a deed, to establish a color of title, and under the former decisions of this court, color or title may exist without a deed.” Baldwin v Ratcliff, 125 Ill. 376, 383 (1882); County of Piatt v Goodell, 97 Ill. 84 (1880); Smith v Ferguson, 91 Ill. 304 (1878); Hassett v Ridgely, 49 111. 197 (1868); Brooks v. Bruyn, 35 Ill. 392 (1864); McCagg v Heacock, 34 Ill. 476 (1864); Bride v Watt, 23 Ill. 507 (1860); and Woodward v Blanchard, 16111. 424 (1855). All of these cases being still valid and none being overruled, in effect, the statements in these cases are well established law. All of the documents described in these cases are the main avenues of claimed land ownership in America today, yet none actually conveys the true and allodial title. They in fact convey something quite different.

When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an appearance of or apparent title, such a statement is correct but perhaps too vague to be properly understood in its correct legal context. What are useful are the more pragmatic statements concerning titles. A title or color of title, in order to be effective in transferring the ownership or purported ownership of the land, must be a marketable or merchantable title.

A marketable or merchantable title is one that is reasonably

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free from doubt. Austin v Barnum, 52 Minn. 136 (1892). This title must be as reasonably free from doubts as necessary to not affect the marketability or salability of the property, and must be a title a reasonably prudent person would be willing to accept. Robert v McFadden, 32 Tex-Civ.App. 47, 74 S.W. 105 (1903). Such a title is often described as one which would ensure to the purchaser a peaceful enjoyment of the property, Barnard v Brown, 112 Mich. 452, 70 N.W. 1038 (1897), and it is stated that such a title must be obvious, evident, apparent, certain, sure or indubitable. Ormsby v Graham, 123 Ia. 202, 98 N.W. 724 (1904). Marketable Title Acts, which have been adopted in several of the states, generally do not lend themselves to an interpretation that they might operate to provide a new foundation of title based upon a stray, accidental, or interloping conveyance. Their object is to provide, for the recorded fee simple ownership, an exemption from the burdens of old conditions which at each transfer of the property interferes with its marketability. Wichelman v Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800 (1957). what each of these legal statements in the various factual situations says is that the color of title is never described as the absolute or actual title, rather each says that it is one of the types of titles necessary to convey ownership or apparent ownership. A marketable title, what a color of title must be in order to be effective, must be a title which is good of recent record, even if it may not be the actual title in fact.

Close  v    Stuyvesant, 132 Ill. 607, 24 N.E. 868 (1890). Authorities hold that to render a title marketable it is only